In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible items under price rigidities. We propose a polynomial algorithm that can be used to find over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrained Walrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of sellers' expected profits and items' expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits.
Introduction
Problem of allocating resources among selfish agents has been a well-established research theme in economics and recently becomes an emerging research topic in AI because AI methodologies can provide computational techniques [Rothkopf et al., 1998; Sandholm, 2002; Zhang et al., 2010] to the balancing of computation tractability and economic (or societal) needs in these problems.
Dynamic mechanisms for resource allocation are trading mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices and equilibrium allocations based on price adjustment processes [Ausubel, 2006; Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Zhang et al., 2010] Assume a seller wishes to sell a set of indivisible items to a number of buyers. The seller announces the current prices of the items and the buyers respond by reporting the set of items they wish to buy at the given prices. The seller then calculates the over-demanded set of items and increases the prices of over-demanded items. This iterative process continues until all the selling items can be sold at the prices at which each buyer is assigned with items that maximize her personal net benefit. Different from one-shot combinatorial auctions [Cramton et al., 2006] , the main issue of a dynamic mechanism is whether the procedure can lead to an equilibrium state (Walrasian equilibrium) at which all the selling items are effectively allocated to the buyers (equilibrium allocation) and the price of items gives the buyers their best values [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999; Kelso et al., 1982; Lehmann et al., 2006; Sun and Yang, 2009] .
Most of the discussions on the issues of dynamic mechanisms are based on market models in which there does not exist price rigidities. In fact, "good" allocations must look after both sides economy efficiency and social equality, and price rigidities may play a key role in some of these problems. For instance, in an estate bubble period, housing cost is unbearable for most of the members of society. The government may need to allocate some housing resources (whose prices are not completely flexible but restricted under some price rigidities) to middle-income earners. On one hand, the lower bound prices can be made according to some basic economic requirements (e.g., construction costs); on the other hand, the upper bound prices 1 should be made according to some realistic social foundation (e.g., average income level or pay ability). It is well-known that a Walarasian equilibrium exists in the economy when there are no price rigidities. In the case of price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist since the equilibrium price vector may not be admissible.
Talman and Yang studied the equilibrium allocation of heterogeneous indivisible items under price rigidities, and proposed the concept of constrained Walrasian equilibria [Talman and Yang, 2008] . A constrained Walrasian equilibrium consists of a price vector p, a rationing system R, and a (constrained) equilibrium allocation π [Lehmann et al., 2006] s.t. p obeys the price rigidities, and π assigns each buyer an item (permitted by R) that maximizes her personal net benefit at p. They also proposed two dynamic auction procedures that produce constrained Walrasian equilibria. However, the computational issues of these procedures have not been touched.
In this paper, we present a polynomial algorithm that can be used to find over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism(called MAPR) with rationing to discover constrained Walrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. In MAPR, buyers compete with each other (with the help of the seller) on prices of items for mul-tiple rounds. In each round, the seller announces the current price vector (initially, the lower bound price vector) of the items that remain, then the buyers respond by reporting the set of resources they wish to buy, then the seller computes a minimal over-demanded set X min of the items. If X min = ∅ then the final allocation is computed by the RM subroutine and MAPR stops. Otherwise if all the prices of the items in X min are less than their upper bounds then the seller increases them; else an item a ∈ X min (whose price is on its upper bound) is picked and the buyers who only demand some items (including a) in X min draw lots for the right to buy a. Since MAPR's execution process is nondeterministic, we define the concepts of buyers' expected profits and items' expected prices, and consider strategical issues (in the sense of expected profit) in MAPR.
Here are main contributions of our work:
• We address the computational problems of dynamic auction proposed by [Talman and Yang, 2008] , where these problems have not been touched.
• [Talman and Yang, 2008] has not finished the proof about the existence of constrained Walrasian equilibrium. We propose an algorithm to get the final allocation and several lemmas to prove the criteria required in constrained Walrasian equilibrium.
• We defined the "expected profits" and "expected prices"
and discuss strategical issues. This paper is structured as follows.
First, we review some basic notions that are relevant to our work (see [Talman and Yang, 2008] for further details and examples). Second, we represent demand situations with bipartite graphs. Third, we address the computation of minimal over-demanded sets of items. Fourth, we present MAPR, and prove formally that it yields a constrained Walrasian equilibrium in polynomial time. Fifth, we consider strategical issues in MAPR. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
Preliminaries
Consider a market situation where a seller wishes to sell a finite set X of indivisible items to a finite number of buyers N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The item o ∈ X is a dummy item which can be assigned to more than one buyer. Items (eg., houses or apartments) in X \ {o} may be heterogeneous.
A price vector p ∈ Z X + assigns a non-negative integer to each a ∈ X and p a is the price of a under p. It is required that p a is not completely flexible and restricted to an interval
We say p and p as the lower and upper bound price vectors. P = {p ∈ Z X + |(∀a ∈ X)p a ≤ p a ≤ p a } is called the set of admissible price vectors. Each i ∈ N has an integer value function, i.e., u i : X → Z + . u i (a) is i's valuation to item a. We assume u i is i's private information, u i (o) = 0, and i can pay max a∈X p a units of money. We say E = N, X, {u i } i∈N is an economy. A rationing system is a function R : N × X → {0, 1} s.t. R(i, o) = 1 for every i ∈ N . R(i, a) = 1 means that buyer i is allowed to demand item a, while R(i, a) = 0 means that i is not allowed to demand a. At p ∈ P and rationing system R, the indirect utility V i (p, R) and constrained demand D i (p, R) of buyer i is given by:
Conditions (1) and (2) need no explanation. Condition (3) says that if the price of a item is greater than its lower bound then it must be assigned to some buyer. (4) states that if an buyer is not allowed to demand some items then the item must be assigned to another buyer at its upper bound price. Condition (5) says that if an buyer is allowed to demand a item which she was not allowed to demand, then she will demand the item. To sum up, constrained Walrasian equilibrium is a equilibrium state under price rigidities. All the five conditions make a balance between efficiency and equality.
The following example is modified from the one given in [Talman and Yang, 2008] . It illustrates the notions introduced in this section and will be used throughout the paper.
Example 1 Let E = N, X, {ui}i∈N be an economy such that N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, X = {o, a, b, c, d}, and buyers' values are given in Table 1 ; price vector p = (0, 5, 4, 4, 7); and π be an allocation of X such that π(1) = o, π(2) = c, π(3) = b, π(4) = a, and π(5) = d. Suppose the lower and upper bound price vectors are p = (0, 5, 4, 1, 5), and p = (0, 6, 6, 4, 7), respectively. So p is an admissible price vector. Let R be a rationing system such that Table 1 . Obviously, p, R, π is a constrained Walrasian equilibrium.
Demand Situation and Maximum Consistent Allocation
Given an economy E = N, X, {u i } i∈N , we call D = (D i ) i∈N a demand situation of E if there is a price vector p and a rationing system R such that
It is not hard to see that a matching M in BG(D) determines an allocation consistent with D. π M denotes the allocation determined by M , that is, π M (i) = a if ∃{i, a} ∈ M , and π M (i) = o otherwise. Suppose M is maximum, then π M is maximum and it is easy to find that: there exists an equilibrium allocation ⇔ |M | = |{i ∈ N |o ∈ D i }| ⇔ π M is an equilibrium allocation.
In fact, to find a maximum matching in a bipartite graph is a pure combinatorial optimization problem, which can be addressed in polynomial time. [Schrijver, 2004] presents the matching augmenting algorithm MA, which takes a bipartite graph G = V, E and a matching M in G as input, and outputs a matching MA(G,
. So a maximum matching can be found in time O(|V||E|) (as we do at most |V| iterations), i.e., O(|N ||X| min(|N |, |X|)). In the following discussion,M D denotes the maximum matching of BG(D) found by this way. 0, 5, 4, 3, 5) and R be the rationing system such that R(i, a) = 1 for all i, a ∈ N × X. Then buyers' constrained demands at p and R are:
Example 2 See the economy given in Example 1. Let price vector
p = (D1(p, R) = {c, d}, D2(p, R) = D3(p, R) = {c}, D4(p, R) = {a}, D5(p, R) = {d}. Let D = (Di(p, R))i∈N . Then MD = {{1, c}, {4, a}, {5, d}}.
Over-demanded Set of Items
What can lead to non-existence of equilibrium allocations? This is a key issue that we need to consider.
Given a demand situation D = (D i ) i∈N , a set of real items X ′ ⊆ X \ {o} is over-demanded in D, if the number of buyers who demand only items in X ′ is strictly greater than the number of items in
is not under-demanded, if the number of buyers who demand some items in X ′ is not less than the number of items in X ′ , i.e., |{i ∈ N |D i ∩ X ′ = ∅}| ≥ |X ′ |. An over-demanded set X ′ is minimal if no strict subset of X ′ is over-demanded. We can get Lemma 1 directly based on these definitions.
Lemma 1 Let
Theorem 1 answers the question proposed in the beginning of this section. 
Pick a buyer i from N ′ \ N ∩ e∈M e. We construct a sequence X0, N0 , X1, N1 , . . . as follow:
pick i from {i ∈ N |o ∈ Di} \ e∈M e; 3.
for all a ∈ X ′ 9.
11.
Xmin := Xmin ∪ {a}; 14.
return Xmin; Figure 1 : MODS algorithm.
• X0 = Di, N0 = {j ∈ N |(∃a ∈ X0){j, a} ∈ M };
Pick any k ≥ 0 and a ∈ X k . Suppose there does not exist j ∈ N such that {j, a} ∈ M . Then there is an M -augmenting path [Schrijver, 2004 ] from a to i, i.e., M is not maximum, contradicting the fact that M is maximum. So for all k ≥ 0 and a ∈ X k , there exists j ∈ N such that {j, a} ∈ M . Consequently,
For each b ∈ XK , b is assigned to only one buyer in NK at π M . And for each j ∈ NK , Dj ⊆ XK and j is assigned with only one item in XK at π M . So |XK | = |NK |. Consequently, |{i ∈ N |Di ⊆ XK }| ≥ |NK ∪ {i}| = |NK | + 1 = |XK | + 1 > |XK |. So XK is an over-demanded set of items in D.
To find a minimal over-demanded set of items, we develop the MODS algorithm shown in Figure 1 . Given a demand situation D, andM D s.t. |M D | < |{i ∈ N |o ∈ D i }|, MODS returns a minimal over-demanded set of items X min . The basic idea of MODS is to generate an over-demanded set X ′ firstly (see lines 2-6 in Figure 1 ), and then (according to Lemma 1) to find a minimal over-demanded set X min ⊆ X ′ (see lines 7-14 in Figure 1) .
The correctness of algorithm MODS is directly from Lemma 1 and the proof of Theorem 1. Let BG(D) = V, E . Observe MODS and we can find the following facts.
1. In order to generate an over-demanded set X ′ (lines 4-6 in Figure 1 ), MODS only visits edges in E. For each e ∈ E, e can be visited once at most. 2 ).
Example 3 See D andMD described in Example 2. It is easy to
find that |MD| < |{i ∈ N |o ∈ Di}|. We apply MODS algorithm
Figure 2: RM algorithm.
to (D,MD). Firstly, an over-demanded set X ′ = {c, d} is found. And then a minimal over-demanded set Xmin = {c} is found.
Mechanism for Resource Allocation under Price Rigidities
In this section, we present a polynomial mechanism for resource allocation under price rigidities (MAPR). Its basic idea is to eliminate over-demanded sets of items by increasing the prices of over-demanded items or rationing an overdemanded item whose price has reached its upper bound.
MAPR
(1) The seller ϕ announces the set X of items to allocate, and sets (8) ϕ picks an item a from X and asks the buyers in {i ∈ N * |a ∈ D i ⊆ X min } to draw lots for the right to buy a. Let i be the winning buyer. ϕ sets M t+1 := M t ∪ {{i, a}}, N ′ := N * \ {i} and p t+1 := p t . Let t:=t+1. Go to (2). [Talman and Yang, 2008] provides two dynamic procedures that produce constrained Walrasian equilibrium. But it does not address the computation issues, and the third condition of constrained Walrasian equilibrium cannot be guaranteed either. In order to make sure that all the items whose prices exceed their lower bound prices will be sold(the third criterion of constrained Walrasian equilibrium), the RM subroutine shown in Figure 2 is called in step 9. Given a demand situation D = (D i ) i∈N , a partial matching M consistent with D, the current price vector p, and the lower bound price vector p, RM returns a matching M ′ such that
(5) Each
Observe MAPR and RM subroutine. We can find that:
• computation of each step is polynomial in |N | and |X|;
• for each t ≥ 0, the number of the loops consisting of steps 3-5 is not more than |X|; and • the number of the loops consisting of steps 2-8 is not more than
Consequently, MAPR always terminates and is polynomial in |N |, |X|, and
In order to prove the correctness of MAPR and RM, we will first give some definitions and provide three lemmas, then we will prove that MAPR can lead to a constrained Walrasian equilibrium with the help of these three lemmas. In the following discussion, we suppose that MAPR terminates at some time
for all i, a ∈ N × X, where R i is the vector kept by buyer i at time t), and (D t i ) i∈N denote the price vector, partial matching that has been made so far, rationing system, and demand situation at time 0 ≤ t ≤ T , respectively. Let X t = {a ∈ X \ e∈M t e|p t a > p a } and N t = {i ∈ N \ e∈M t e|D t i ∩ X t = ∅}. Now we introduce three auxiliary lemmas (in which D = (D i ) i∈N denotes a demand situation). These three lemmas are closely connected. The proof of Lemma 4 is based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, and the proof of Theorem 2 is based on the these three lemmas. Lemma 2 states that, each nonempty subset of a minimal over-demanded set of items is not under-demanded. Lemma 2 Let X ′ be a minimal over-demanded set of items.
The proof of Lemma 2 is not very hard, and comes from using the reduction to absurdity. Lemma 3 states that, the cardinality of a maximum matching is not less than the cardinality of a set of real items if each subset of the set is not under-demanded.
The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to that of Theorem 1. Due to lack of space, it is omitted. Lemma 4 states that, all the items in X t can be sold. The proof of Lemma 4 is based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Let
1. It holds at t = 0 because X 0 = ∅.
Suppose MAPR does not stop att
3. Then Xmin = ∅ and X are computed at timet and steps 6-7 of MAPR. Pick any ∅ ⊂ X ′ ⊆ Xt +1 . Let N1 = {i ∈ Nt|Dt i ⊆ Xmin and Dt i ∩ X ′ = ∅} and N2 = {i ∈ Nt|Dt i ∩ (X ′ \ Xmin) = ∅}. There are two possibilities:
Case I : X = ∅. So Xt +1 = Xt ∪ Xmin. According to Lemma 2 and item 2, we have |N1| > |X ′ ∩ Xmin| and |N2| ≥ |X ′ \ Xmin|. It is easy to find that Dt
Case II : X = ∅ and some a ∈ X is assigned to some buyer j such that a ∈ Dt j ⊆ Xmin. So Xt +1 = Xt \ {a}. According to Lemma 2 and item 2, we have |N1| > |X ′ ∩ Xmin| and |N2| ≥ |X ′ \ Xmin|. It is easy to find that Table 1 and Table 2 . We can find that u *
6.2 * ) = 5. As most collective decision mechanisms, MAPR is generally not strategyproof (in the sense of expected profit). For instance, see Example 4. If buyer 1 reports her demands sincerely, then her expected profit is 0. However, if 1 knows other buyers' valuations and reports strategically, then she reports {c} from t = 0 to t = 3 (i.e., as if her valuation to item c is not less than 7), then reports sincerely, then her expected profit changes to 1/3, which makes her better off. Now we are interested in two questions: (1) is MAPR strategyproof for some restricted domains? (2) when it is not, how hard is it for an buyer who knows the valuations of the others to compute an optimal strategy? First we define reporting strategies and manipulation problems formally. Without loss of generality, let 1 be the manipulator. Note that not every sequence of 1's demands is reasonable. For instance, see Example 4 and Table 2 . The seller can detect 1's manipulation if 1 reports {c}, {c}, {c, d}, and {c} at t = 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively, because there is no value function u s.t.
A strategy for buyer 1 is a value function u : X → Z + with u(o) = 0. So 1 can safely manipulate the process of MAPR when she reports her demands according to u completely (as if u is her true value function). A manipulation problem M (for buyer 1) is a 5-tuple N, X, {u i } i∈N , p, p where N, X, {u i } i∈N is an economy, p and p are the lower and upper bound price vectors on X, respectively. A strategy for M is optimal if 1 can not strictly increase her expected profit by reporting her demands according to any other strategy. Now, back to question (1): we show that the answer is positive when there are two buyers.
Theorem 3 Let M = N, X, {u i } i∈N , p, p be a manipulation problem s.t. N = {1, 2}. Then u 1 is optimal for M . PROOF. Suppose that if 1 reports sincerely, then her expected profit is ∆. Let D1 and D2 be 1 and 2's true demands at p and R respectively, where R(i, a) = 1 for each i ∈ N and a ∈ X.
Obviously, if D1 ∪ D2 = {o} or |D1 ∪ D2| ≥ 2 (i.e., Xmin = ∅ at t = 0) then ∆ = maxa∈X(u1(a)−p a ), which is the best possible outcome for 1. So u1 is optimal in these cases. . Because 2 can insist on {a} to t = min(k, k2 − 1) ≥ k1 − 1, 1's expected profit can not be better than ∆. . Because 2 can insist on {a} to t = k2 − 1, 1's expected profit can not be better than ∆.
To sum up, in all cases, 1 can not strictly increase her expected profit by applying strategy u ′ . So u1 is optimal for M .
For the cases where there are more than two buyers, we conjecture that the manipulation problem is NP-hard, but we could not find a proof.
Conclusion
We have presented a decentralized protocol for allocating indivisible resources under price rigidities, and proved formally that it can discover constrained Walrasian equilibria in polynomial time. We also have studied the protocol from the points of computation of buyers' expected profits and items' expected prices, and discussed the manipulation (by one buyer) problem in the sense of buyer's expected profit. There are several directions for future work. One direction would be to prove the conjecture about the complexity of manipulation (in the sense of expected profits) by one buyer. Another direction would be to study manipulation (in the sense of expected prices) by one or more buyers (whose manipulation motivation is not to buy some resources but to put up the prices of some resources). Furthermore, we plan to study the problems of allocating divisible resources [Brams et al., 2012] and sharable resources [Airiau and Endriss, 2010] under prices rigidities.
